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We consider a continuous spatial economy consisting of pure exchange local 
economies. Agents are allowed to change their location over time as a response to 
spatial utility differentials. These spatial adjustments toward higher utility 
neighborhoods lead the spatial economy to converge to a spatially uniform allocation of 
resources, provided that the matrix of price effects is quasi-negative definite. 
Furthermore our model provides a real time interpretation of the tâtonnement story. 
Also, spatial fluctuations are shown to be damped at different rates according to their 
spatial scale.   
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The distribution of economic activities over the geographical space results from the in-
teraction between dispersion and agglomeration forces. Dispersion forces create incen-
tives for agents to relocate toward less populated locations, thus contributing to spatial
convergence. On the other hand, agglomeration forces create incentives for agents to
relocate toward more populated locations, thus contributing to spatial divergence.
In much of the existing literature, geography is summarized by two or a ﬁnite num-
ber of countries. Lately, the need to rely on a continuous spatial approach has been
reemphasized by Krugman (1996), Fujita et al. (1999), and Quah (1996, 2002). When
using a continuous approach to describe an economy, variables of the model are spatial
distributions over the physical geography. In this context, dynamics is concerned with
the evolution of these spatial distributions over time. Of course, like in discrete mod-
els, the continuous spatial approach allows to address stability issues by determining
conditions under which spatial convergence or divergence may happen. In addition it
allows to describe the spatial dimension of the convergence process or to assess the
spatial extent of agglomerations when they emerge. See Krugman (1996) and Fujita et
al. (1999) for spatial agglomerations driven by increasing returns, or the spatial growth
model of Quah (2002) for spatial clusters driven by spatial externalities.
In models expressed in a continuous spatial setting such as described above, the
local market structure plays a central role on the convergence/divergence issue.
On the one hand, in economic geography models of international trade, imperfectcompetition and increasing returns generate centripetal forces leading to the emergence
of agglomerations (i.e. concentrations of economic activities in some locations rather
than in some others), see, for instance, Krugman (1996), Fujita et al. (1999), or Mossay
(2003). These models are an extension of Krugman (1991)’s two-country model to the
case of a continuous spatial economy. In these models, the continuous spatial approach
is crucial in that it determines spatial features of the economy such as the preferred
wavelength (e.g. Krugman (1996), Fujita et al. (1999)), or the critical wavelength
(e.g. Mossay (2003)) which give an indication on the size and number of emerging
agglomerations.
On the other hand, perfect competition at the local level, such as in the examples
provided by Sonnenchein (1981, 1982), generates centrifugal forces l e a d i n gt os p a t i a l
convergence (i.e. the dispersion of economic activities across locations). Sonnenchein
shows the global convergence of the economy toward a uniform long-run equilibrium.
For that aim, Sonnenschein adopted a structure of perfectly competitive local markets
along the lines of Rosen (1974) and developed a general equilibrium model with a
continuum of commodities, consumers and mobile ﬁrms. Locally, the price of the local
good is determined by local supply and local demand. Because the number of ﬁrms
need not be the same across space, prices and therefore short-run proﬁts may vary
across locations, which create an incentive for ﬁrms to change their location over time.
Adjustments of ﬁrms are assumed to be spatially local (neighborhood feasible) and
temporally myopic (expectations are static). These spatial adjustments of ﬁrms towardhigher proﬁt neighborhoods, lead the economy to converge, thus permitting prices and
the distribution of ﬁrms to become uniform across locations.
In this paper we study further the implication of perfect competition at the local
level in a spatial economy. Our aim is to determine the conditions under which spatial
convergence occurs when local markets are pure exchange economies. We thus extend
the result obtained in the case of the very speciﬁc examples of Sonnenchein (1981,
1982), to a general class of economies. Here, spatial utility diﬀerentials provide adequate
migration incentives for leading the spatial economy to converge to a spatially uniform
allocation of resources.
Our model is built with a continuum of commodities and mobile consumers. Con-
sumers exchange their endowment for current consumption in the local market where
they are. Further they are allowed to change their location over time. We make the
same assumptions concerning the spatial adjustments as the ones made in Sonnen-
schein (1981, 1982). Namely, agents move locally in the geographical space and have
static expectations when dealing with migration decisions.
We show that, provided that the matrix of price eﬀects is quasi-negative deﬁnite,
local spatial convergence holds for a spatial economy whose local markets consist of pure
exchange economies. Such a suﬃcient condition also ensures the stability of the tâton-
nement process. Therefore the spatial convergence issue is to be related to the Walrasian
stability of the underlying spaceless economy. However, while the tâtonnement dynam-
ics proceeds in ﬁctive time, see Hahn (1982), the spatial adjustments of agents acrosslocations, take place in real time. This means that the dynamics of our model provides
a real time interpretation of the tâtonnement story. Also, we provide a spatial analysis
of the convergence process by showing that spatial ﬂuctuations are damped at a rate
inversely quadratic with their spatial scale.
Even though it might seem anachronistic to devote attention to competitive ap-
proaches to geographical economics problems, we do think that perfectly competitive
forces deserve to be understood at least as well as agglomerations mechanisms. After
all, perfectly competitive forces constitute the most important dispersion force that,
together with agglomeration forces, shape a spatial economy.
So as to investigate the spatio-temporal dynamics of the model, we perform a stan-
dard linear stability analysis around a spatially uniform steady state by using the method
of normal modes. Like in most partial diﬀerential equation problems, only linear stud-
ies turn out to be tractable in economics. See Quah (2002)’s spatial growth model, or
the economic geography models by Krugman (1996), Fujita et al. (1999), or Mossay
(2003). The normal mode stability analysis consists in studying how small initial pe-
riodic perturbations - called normal modes - evolve over time.T h er e a s o nf o rs t u d y i n g
the behavior of periodic perturbations is that they constitute the Fourier components
of any arbitrary spatial perturbation. A general perturbation may then be viewed as
an appropriate linear combination of these normal modes. The ampliﬁcation factor cor-
responding to a normal mode is deﬁned as the growth rate of that normal mode. As
it is done in practice, the ampliﬁcation factor of every normal mode is computed. If allnormal modes have a negative ampliﬁcation factor, meaning that the amplitude of each
mode decreases over time, then spatial convergence takes place. On the other hand, if
some normal modes have a positive ampliﬁcation factor, meaning that the amplitude
of these modes increases over time, then spatial divergence occurs. For further details
concerning the normal mode stability analysis, see a general reference in hydrodynamic
stability, e.g. Drazin and Reid (1991).
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the continuous spatial
environment. We deﬁne the short-run equilibrium keeping the distribution of agents
ﬁxed in section 3. In section 4 we explain how agents myopically adjust their location
over time. Then we deﬁne the long-run equilibrium in section 5, and the analysis of
spatial convergence is performed in section 6. We conclude thereafter.
2 The Spatial Environment
In this section, the continuous spatial environment is described. We consider a spatial
economy (E) with a continuum of locations s ∈ C =[0,2Π].T i m e i s d e n o t e d b y t.
There are H t y p e so fa g e n t sd e n o t e db yh, who are distributed along the circle C.T h e
density of type-h agents in location s, at time t, is denoted by Ah(s,t).1 In each location
there are L local goods denoted by l.E a c ht y p e - h agent is continuously endowed with
a constant bundle Eh ∈ RL
+ over time. The instantaneous utility function for type-h
1More precisely, there are Ah(s,t)ds type-h agents in region [s,s + ds] at time t.agent is represented by Uh(.).
In the model below, we will follow Sonnenschein’s approach (1981, 1982) by dis-
regarding issues related to intertemporal trading (e.g. borrowing and lending). This
approach is also widely used in the economic geography literature, see Krugman (1991)
or Ottaviano (1999).
Assumption 1 There is no intertemporal trade.
Equivalently, this means that agents spend all their current income on current con-
sumption. The central point of our approach is the spatial separation of markets.
Assumption 2 Agents can trade with one another at time t i fa n do n l yi ft h e ya r ei n
the same location at time t.
This is the form of spatial separation of markets as introduced by Townsend (1990).
Furthermore, like in Sonnenschein (1981, 1982), we consider a perfectly competitive
local market structure.
Assumption 3 L o c a lm a r k e t sa r ep u r ee x c h a n g ee c o n o m i e s .
In each location s, there is thus a competitive market for the L traded local commodi-
ties, at any time t. The role of the local market structure is central. Here, by focusing
on local pure exchange economies, we consider the simplest local market structure. The
main reason is that it will allow us to identify the role of local perfect competition on
spatial convergence.So as to avoid existence and uniqueness diﬃculties concerning the consumption
problem, we will assume that there is a unique bundle which maximizes the consumer’s
utility. Furthermore we will assume that the individual demand function exists and is
continuously diﬀerentiable.
Assumption 4 Uh(.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave.
3 Short-Run Equilibrium
In this section we deﬁne what we mean by a short-run equilibrium of the spatial economy
(E). The short-run terminology refers to the fact that the distributions of agents are
supposed to be ﬁxed. Therefore, local prices are assumed to form instantaneously, and
clear all the local markets as in the Walrasian tradition.





h =1 ,...,H.T y p e - h agents at location s at time t, consider the price vector P(s,t)
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The maximum utility Uh available in location s at time t corresponds to the indirect

















Deﬁnition 1 (Short-Run Equilibrium) A short-run equilibrium of the spatial econ-




, h =1 ,...,H,
as given, by consumption distributions Zh(s,t), h =1 ,...,H, and a price distribution
P(s,t) satisfying the consumption problem (2) and the market clearing condition (4) in
all locations s ∈ C.




, h =1 ,...,H.A s
an immediate consequence of Assumption 4, given these spatial distributions of agents,
there exists a short-run equilibrium of the spatial economy (E).
In a short-run equilibrium, such as deﬁned above, consumption levels of agents may




, h =1 ,...,H.
There is thus an incentive for agents to change their location when their indirect utility
is not equalized through space. Before dealing with this in the section below, we deﬁne
the spaceless economy (Σ) underlying the spatial economy (E).Deﬁnition 2 (The Spaceless Underlying Economy) The spaceless economy (Σ)
underlying the spatial economy (E) is a pure-exchange economy. There are H types
of agents denoted by h and L goods denoted by l. Like in the local markets of the
spatial economy (E), type-h agents are endowed with the bundle Eh and have utility
function Uh, and Assumption 4 holds. In this spaceless economy (Σ),t y p e - h agents are
in number Bh ≥ 0. They choose a consumption bundle Xh so as to maximize Uh(Xh)












Major properties of the spatial economy (E) will require restrictions on the cor-
responding underlying economy (Σ). We will therefore frequently refer to (Σ) in the
following sections.
4 Spatial Adjustment
We now introduce spatial dynamics by specifying a local process of adjustment of
agents through the geographical space. Following Sonnenschein (1981, 1982), spatial
adjustments are assumed to be spatially local and temporally myopic. This means that
agents are only required to know prices locally. We make this clear in the two following
assumptions.
Assumption 5 Migration is local.Migration is viewed here as a local process, in the sense that no instantaneous migra-
tion can take place between two locations separated by a ﬁnite distance. Nevertheless,
the continuous ﬂows involved allow ﬁnite and even large scale migration over time.
Local migration behavior is consistent with empirical ﬁndings according to which the
intensity of migration ﬂows declines with the increasing distance between origin and
destination, see Ravenstein (1885), Shaw (1975), or Wheeler et al. (1998). By making
the local migration assumption we tend to focus on what we believe to be the most
important part of migration ﬂows.
Eventhough long range and international migrations play an important role in ex-
plaining the growth of large cities, the local aspect of migration is found back in many
migratory patterns in world history. A ﬁrst illustratory case is the westward movement
of Anglo-Saxons and other Europeans in the United States during the 19th century.
They gradually moved away from the East coast toward the West coast. This move-
ment was a slow and continuous westward process.2 Another case where the local aspect
is found, is the rural migratory patterns in France during the 18th and 19th centuries,
see Ariès (1979). Peasants migrated over short distances and gave rise to numerous
small-size cities (called ”bourgs” in French) spread all over France.
Assumption 6 Agents have static expectations.
2A continuous spatial approach was proposed by Hotelling (1921) to describe these migration ﬂows.
Migration was assimilated to a pure diﬀusion process. However, no microeconomic foundation was
proposed by Hotelling.This assumption means that when making their migration choice at time t,a g e n t s
do believe that the spatial distribution of prices P(s,t) prevailing at time t,w i l lp r e v a i l
forever.
Assumptions 5 and 6 concerning the migration decision process have the following
implication. Consider agents located in s∗ at time t∗. As migration is local, they
will move in the surrounding of s∗, basing their migration choice by regarding Uh(s,t)
as equal to Uh(Xh(P(s,t∗),Eh) for s in the neighborhood of s∗,a n dt>t ∗.A s i n
Sonnenchein (1981, 1982), agents adjust their location by choosing the optimal velocity















where V h denotes the velocity of type-h agents and kh is inversely related to the intensity
of their migration cost.
As a result of (6), type-h agents at location s at t move over the distance V h(s,t)dt





where kh reﬂects the adjustment speed to spatial utility diﬀerentials for type-h agents.
This means that migration of agents is modelled as a gradient adjustment process.
At each point in time, type-h agents at location s move in the direction of the highest
indirect utility Uh(s,t).So far, we have described how agents change their location over time. We still need
to say how these spatial adjustments aﬀect the distributions of agents Ah.T h i s w i l l
allow us to describe how the distribution of agents Ah evolves over time. It turns out
that once the distribution of adjustment V h(s,t) is known at time t, we can deduce
how the distribution Ah changes over time.
Consider a region Γ =[ s,s + ds].I t s o v e r a l l t y p e - h population, at time t,i s
Ah(s,t)ds. The conservation law of population h asserts that the rate of increase of
population h in region Γ is equal to the ﬂow of population h into Γ through its borders







h(s + ds,t) − Φ
h(s,t)) (8)
where Φh(s,t) represents the ﬂow of type-h agents through location s at time t.I t
corresponds to Ah(s,t)V h(s,t).
We can approximate (8) for small time variations, and get that the net increase
of population h in region Γ during time span [t,t + dt] is due to type h-agents ﬂows
through borders s and s + ds
















which can be rewritten as
Ah(s,t + dt) − Ah(s,t)
dt
=
V h(s,t)Ah(s,t) − V h(s + ds,t)Ah(s + ds,t)
dsFigure 1: Conservation Law for Population h

















This is the evolution law for the agent distribution Ah where V h is given by (7).3
The dynamics of the spatial economy (E) over space and time is governed by equa-
tions (2), (4), (7) and (9). We are interested in whether the spatial economy (E)
converges to a long-run equilibrium.
3An equivalent formulation to (9) is DtAh = −A∂sV h,w h e r eDt denotes the material derivative
(Dt ≡ ∂t + V h∂s), see a reference on Fluid Dynamics (e.g. Batchelor (2000)).5 Long-Run Equilibrium
In this section we deﬁne what we mean by long-run equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3 (Long-Run Equilibrium) A long-run equilibrium of the spatial econ-
omy (E)i sd e ﬁned as a stationary state {Ah(s), Zh(s),V h(s), P(s)},h=1 ,...,H of
the system of equations (2), (4), (7), and (9).
Here the particular long-run equilibria of (E) under interest are uniform long-run
equilibria. In a uniform long-run equilibrium, the net ﬂow of agents through any location
is zero, and all local markets are time-invariant, and similar in all respects.
Deﬁnition 4 (Uniform Long-Run Equilibrium) A uniform long-run equilibrium
of the spatial economy (E)i sd e ﬁned as a uniform stationary state
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h =1 ,...,H of the system of equations (2), (4), (7), and (9).
Consider a uniform long-run equilibrium where the number of type-h agents is A
h








, h =1 ,...,H (10)
where Z
h









In general, there may be many price systems P satisfying (10), or equivalently being
an equilibrium price of the underlying economy (Σ) for Bh = A
h
.6 Behavior around the Long-Run Equilibrium
The purpose of this section is to study whether the spatial economy (E)e v o l v e sb a c k
to a uniform long-run equilibrium when initially deviated from it. This will be done
in several steps. First, we will consider a spatial economy (E) which is initially at a
uniform long-run equilibrium such as given by (10). The economy is then deviated
from this equilibrium. The deviations under study are supposed to be small. So as to
measure how far away the spatial economy is from its initial equilibrium, it is useful to
decompose the variables into their uniform long-run equilibrium value and their corre-
sponding deviation. The equations describing the time evolution of these deviations are
naturally called perturbation equations. Because initial perturbations are assumed to be
small, we can describe their early evolution by linearizing the equations governing them.
One then obtains linearized perturbation equations. The next step is to characterize the
early evolution of these perturbations. This will be done by decomposing the perturba-
tion into its Fourier components called normal modes. The procedure then consists in
determining whether each of these normal modes dies away or increases in amplitude
over time. This stability analysis is the method of normal modes. If all normal modes
die away, the uniform long-run equilibrium will be said stable, and spatial convergence
occurs. However, if at least one normal mode increases in amplitude over time, then
the long-run equilibrium will be said unstable, and spatial divergence occurs.







L−1) respectively by p, xh, zh and eh.6.1 Perturbation Linearized Equations
In order to perform the linearization of equations (2), (4), (7) and (9), we decompose
the variables zh(s,t),A h(s,t),Vh(s,t), and p(s,t) into their uniform steady state value













The perturbation equations are then obtained by substitution of (11) into equations
(2), (4), (7), and (9). Neglecting second-order terms such as ahwh leads to the following
































6.2 Normal Mode Analysis
The main idea in what follows is to study how periodic spatial perturbations evolve
over time. For the sake of simplicity, you may think of periodic perturbations as beinglike sin(ωs). High (low) values of ω correspond to high (low) frequency pertubations.
The reason for studying the behavior of periodic perturbations is that they constitute
the Fourier components of any arbitrary spatial perturbation. In addition, because
equations have been linearized, we can combine linearly the temporal evolutions of
these periodic perturbations so as to deduce the evolution of any arbitrary perturbation.
However, according to the normal mode analysis,4 we need to consider more general
perturbations in order to deal with our problem.
Deﬁnition 5 (Spatial Mode) A spatial mode is determined by its frequency ω,a n d
is deﬁned as exp[Iωs],w i t hI2 = −1.
As suggested in the case of sinusoidal functions, high (low) frequency modes corre-
spond to small (large) spatial scales. Our analysis consists in determining the evolution
of each of the normal modes. A priori, there should be no reason for normal modes to
h a v et h es a m et i m eb e h a v i o r .
Deﬁnition 6 (Ampliﬁcation Factor) The ampliﬁcation factor corresponding to nor-
mal mode ω will be denoted β(ω).
A negative (positive) real part of β(ω) means that normal mode ω is damped (grow-
ing) over time. Provided β(ω) has a negative real part whatever ω, the spatial economy
4For further details concerning the normal mode stability analysis, see a general reference in hydro-
dynamic stability literature, e.g. Drazin and Reid (1991).will converge to the uniform long-run equilibrium. We can now explicitly deﬁne the
concept of convergence in the context of our continuous spatial economy.
Deﬁnition 7 (Spatial Local Stability) A uniform long-run equilibrium such as de-
ﬁned by (10) is locally stable for the spatial economy (E) provided that the ampliﬁcation
factor β(ω) has a negative real part whatever the normal mode ω.
As the perturbation equations have been linearized, we look for solutions where all
perturbations are proportional to exp[β(ω)t+Iωs], where β(ω) denotes the ampliﬁcation
factor corresponding to normal mode ω

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(16)
where for instance, ah is the constant amplitude of the density perturbation associated
with type-h population.
In what follows, we determine the relationship β(ω), i.e. the ampliﬁcation factor of
each normal mode ω so that (16) is a non-trivial solution of equations (12), (13), (14)
and (15).
6.3 Spatial Convergence
The following deﬁnitions and lemmas will be of use in Proposition 1.Deﬁnition 8 (Stable Matrix) Am a t r i xM =( mij)i,j=1,...,L−1 is stable if all its eigen-
values have negative real parts, that is when Reλ ≤ 0,f o ra n ye i g e n v a l u eλ of M.
Deﬁnition 9 (Quasi-Negative Deﬁnite Matrix) Am a t r i xM =( mij)i,j=1,...,L−1 is
quasi-negative deﬁnite (resp. semideﬁnite) if (M + MT) is negative deﬁnite (resp.
semideﬁnite).
Lemma 1 Consider matrices M =( mij)i,j=1,...,L−1 and N =( nij)
j=1,...,L−1
i=1,...,H .I f M is
quasi-negative semideﬁnite, then the matrix product NMN
T is quasi-negative semidef-
inite.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Lemma 2 Consider a matrix Q =( qij)i,j=1,...,H and a diagonal matrix D =diag(di)i=1,...,H,
with strictly positive entries di > 0.I fQ is quasi-negative semideﬁnite, then the matrix
product DQ is stable.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Here is the spatial convergence result of this paper.
Proposition 1 (Local Spatial Stability) If the matrix of price eﬀects is quasi-negative
deﬁnite in the underlying spaceless economy (Σ)f o rBh = A
h
, then a spatial long-run
equilibrium such as deﬁned by (10) is locally stable.
Proof.Instead of replacing straight the normal representation (16) in the perturbation




h=1,..,H only. Then we will replace ah by its normal mode
representation.
Some manipulations of equations (12), (13), (14) and (15), detailed in Appendix D,


























h(p) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the consumption program of
type-h agents.















The relation (18) may be rewritten in the following matrix form
βa = Ca (19)
where a denotes the vector (a1,...,a H) and C the matrix with entries (chk)h,k=1,...H.
By inspection of relation (19), the ampliﬁcation factor β corresponds to the eigen-
values of matrix C. Thus the uniform long-run equilibrium (10) is stable provided thatmatrix C has eigenvalues with negative real parts.
It turns out that matrix C can be rewritten as
C = DNMN
T (20)

































Dpxj(p) is quasi-negative deﬁnite, so is matrix
M. By using Lemma 1, the matrix product NMN
T is quasi-negative semi-deﬁnite.
Finally, as matrix D is a diagonal matrix with strictly positive elements, it results from
Lemma 2 that matrix C is stable. As a consequence, the ampliﬁcation factor β(ω) has
a negative real part whatever normal mode ω. And the uniform long-run equilibrium
such as deﬁned by (10) is stable. 
First, Proposition 1 shows that spatial utility diﬀerentials provide adequate migration
incentives for leading the spatial economy to converge to a spatially uniform allocation
of resources.
Secondly, Proposition 1 relates the convergence of the spatial economy (Σ)t ot h e
quasi-negativeness of the matrix of price eﬀects. The suﬃcient condition we derived,
also ensures the stability of the tâtonnement process. This is because quasi-negativeness
implies D-stability, see Hahn (1982). Therefore the spatial convergence issue is to berelated to the Walrasian stability of the spaceless economy (Σ) underlying the spatial
economy (E). Moreover, while the tâtonnement dynamics proceeds in ﬁctive time, the
spatial adjustments of agents across locations, take place in real time. This means that
the dynamics of our model provides a real time interpretation of the tâtonnement story.
Furthermore, we provide a ﬁne description of the spatial convergence process by
relating the convergence rate β of a normal mode to its frequency ω.D i ﬀerent spatial
scale perturbations are not damped at the same rate. It is thus important to distinguish
spatial scales when dealing with spatial convergence. In particular, because of quadratic
adjustments costs, β(ω) is quadratic in the frequency ω, see relationships (19) and
(20). The implication of this is that myopic migration leads high frequency (small
spatial scale) perturbations to converge faster than low frequency (large spatial scale)
perturbations.
When perfect competition holds within local markets, as is the case in this work,
agents mobility contributes to spatial convergence provided that the matrix of price
eﬀects is quasi-negative deﬁnite. On the other hand, when monopolistic competition
holds in the spatial economy - as is the case in Krugman (1996), Fujita et al. (1999),
or in Mossay (2003) -, agents mobility contributes to divergence and to the emergence
of spatial agglomerations. As Krugman’s framework is a benchmark model for contin-
uous spatial economies characterized by monopolistic competitive markets,o u rm o d e l
seems to be the corresponding ideal benchmark model for continuous spatial economies
characterized by perfectly competitive local markets. In these two spatial environments,the role of the local structure on the spatial convergence/divergence issue appears as
central. Both frameworks constitute thus a step forward in the understanding of how
spatial convergence or agglomerations emerge.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Our paper reinforces and generalizes the view of Sonnenschein (1981, 1982) to the case
of local pure exchange economies: myopic behavior concerning migration is suﬃcient
to ensure spatial convergence in a local perfect competition environment. This is be-
cause, under perfect competition, spatial utility diﬀerentials provide adequate migration
incentives for leading the spatial economy to converge to a spatially uniform allocation
of resources.
We make clear the fact that the spatial convergence issue is closely related to the
quasi-negative deﬁniteness of the matrix of price eﬀects, which also ensures the stability
of the tâtonnement process of the underlying spaceless economy. Unlike the tâtonnement
dynamics, the spatial adjustments of agents across locations, take place in real time.
This means that the dynamics of our model provides a real time interpretation of the
tâtonnement story. In addition, we have shown that the convergence rate is not the
same for all normal modes. High frequency modes (corresponding to small spatial scale
modes) are damped faster than low frequency modes (corresponding to large spatial
scale modes). This means that because of quadratic adjustments costs, myopic mi-
gration behavior leads small spatial scale shocks to be damped faster than larger spatialscale shocks.
Finally, Sonnenschein (1982) seems to put forward the argument that the conditions
leading to spatial convergence should be less restrive when people have rational expec-
tations than when they have static expectations. In order to address this last issue, it
is necesary to investigate what happens when consumers have forward-looking abilities
and optimize their migration decisions over time.
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Here we establish the perturbation linearized equations (12), (13), (14), (15). Sub-
stituting the decomposition (11) into the evolution equations (2), (4), (7) and (9), yields




























h(p + q(s,t)) , h =1 ,...,H
Then by neglecting second-order terms, we get the perturbation linearized equations
(12), (13), (14), and (15).
A p p e n d i xB :P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Let y and µ be respectively an eigenvector and an eigenvalue of NMN
T +NM
TNT.




T)y = µyN(M + M
T)N
Ty = µy











Since M is quasi-negative semideﬁnite and yTy > 0,w eh a v et h a tµ ≤ 0,m e a n i n gt h a t
NMN
T + NM
TNT is negative semideﬁnite, and thus that NMN
T is quasi-negative
semideﬁnite. 
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2
Let y and µ be respectively an eigenvector and an eigenvalue of DQ.A sDQ need
not be symmetric, y is in general a complex vector and µ a complex number. We have
DQy = µy
Premultiplying this relationship by D−1 leads to
Qy = µD
−1y




−1y (21)We now use the fact f
T
Cg is the complex conjugate of gTCTf ,w h e r ef and g denote




Ty = µ y
TD
−1y (22)
where µ denote the complex conjugate of µ.
By adding up relationships (21) and (22), we get
y
T(Q + Q
T)y =( µ + µ) y
TD
−1y
Since Q is quasi-negative semideﬁnite and yTD−1y > 0,w eh a v et h a t(µ + µ) ≤ 0,
meaning that Reµ ≤ 0.A n dt h u sDQ is stable. 
Appendix D: Some Manipulations to get equation (17)



























































where the underlying economy (Σ)i sr e g u l a rf o rBj = A
j
since, by assumption, the
matrix of price eﬀects is quasi-negative deﬁnite in the underlying spaceless economy
(Σ)f o rBj = A
j
.





























h(p) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the consumption program of
type-h agents.
This leads to equation (17).